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Abstract
This article describes and analyzes the processes the Inter-
nal Refugees have experienced since the establishment of
the state till this day from the perspective of the struggle
over the “refugee identity.” While the state has tried to un-
dermine this identity as part of its policy against the Right
of Return, activists from the refugees’ communities have
done their best to preserve it. In the late 1980s it looked as
if the state’s goal of uprooting the refugee identity was
achieved, but the last decade witnessed an awakening of this
identity. This has a lot to do with the Israeli-Palestinian
peace talks, but also, it is suggested here, with the very na-
ture of “refugee identity,” which has two components, of
which one is positive (“my roots are there”) and one is
negative (“I am not from here”).
Résumé
Cet article décrit et analyse les processus vécus les réfugiés
internes depuis l’établissement de l’État (d’Israël), jusqu’à
aujourd’hui et ce, à travers de leur lutte pour leur « iden-
tité comme réfugié ». Bien que l’État se soit efforcé de
saper cette identité dans le cadre de sa politique contre le
Droit au retour, les militants des camps de réfugiés ont
tout fait pour la préserver. Vers la fin des années 80, il a
semblé que l’État avait effectivement réussi à atteindre
son but, soit de déraciner l’identité des réfugiés; mais la
dernière décennie a vu une renaissance de cette identité.
Les négociations de paix israélo-palestiniennes ont grande-
ment contribué à cet état de chose, mais l’article suggère,
qu’en plus, cela se rapporte à la nature même de « l’iden-
tité du réfugié », qui comporte deux aspects, l’un positif
(« mes racines sont ici ») et l’autre négatif (« je ne suis pas
d’ici »).
T
he Internal Refugees in Israel are Palestinians who
were uprooted from their villages in the course of the
1948 war, but found refuge within the borders of the
state and became its citizens. From 1948, up until today, they
have continuously voiced their demand to return to their
villages, only to be met by the refusal of all Israeli govern-
ments. For the most part, their lands were allocated to Jewish
settlement. While constituting a part of the general refugee
problem, the moral, political, and practical controversy
about the Internal Refugees is one of the most concrete
expressions of the structural conflict between the state of
Israel and its Arab citizens.
This article aims to analyze the relations between the
State of Israel and the Palestinian Internal Refugees from
the perspective of the struggle over the “refugee identity”
from 1948 war onwards. After introducing the roots of the
problem of the Internal Refugees and the legal mechanisms
through which Israel took over their lands, the article deals
with the Israeli policy of abolishing their identity, and with
the resistance of groups within these communities. The last
decade is  witnessing a revival of the “refugee identity,”
which will be presented and analyzed at the end of the paper.
The Roots of the Problem and the Denial of
Return
The roots of this phenomenon are to be found in the way in
which Palestinian Arabs were uprooted from areas con-
quered by Jewish forces in the 1948 war. Terrified by the
advancing Israeli army, whole communities had left their
villages and sought refuge in neighbouring villages, which
had not yet been conquered, or in large towns, which they
believed would never be taken by the Israelis. But most of
these villages and towns were indeed conquered, and their
inhabitants, as well as their “guests,” were uprooted. In the
rare cases where the host communities had stayed in place,
the refugees  from the neighbouring villages stayed with

them, or at least tried to.1 That was the case with thousands
of villagers from the eastern Galilee, who concentrated in the
town of Nazareth prior to its occupation. The same goes for
many refugees who, relying on the close ties between the
Druze leadership and the Israeli army, fled to Druze villages,
hoping they would be allowed to stay. Many others found
asylum in villages which had surrendered later to the Israeli
army without battle, and became parts of the new state of
Israel with their inhabitants.2
The first reaction of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was
to drive the refugees who remained in the state of Israel over
the border, in order to prevent them from returning to their
villages. Thousands of refugees were thus expelled from the
region of Ramah and Peqi’in (in upper Galilee) and from
the town of Majdal (Ashkelon, on the southern coast of the
state). Similarly,  Israel has pressured refugees  who had
settled in villages in the Arab triangle to leave their new homes
prior to the allocation of this area to the state of Israel (as was
agreed upon in talks with Jordan held in Rhodes).3
In spite of the forced expulsion, according to official
estimates some twenty-five thousand Internal Refugees re-
mained within the borders of the newborn state, mainly in
the Galilee, constituting about one-sixth of the total Arab
population.4 Unable to carry on extensive acts of deporta-
tion after the war, Israel now had to tackle the task of
preventing them from returning to their villages and reoc-
cupying their lands.
One can find three reasons for the Israeli refusal to allow
the return of the Internal Refugees to their villages and
lands. The first was the will to expand Jewish settlement. In
this context the uprooting of Arab residents was seen by
Israeli Zionist leaders as a golden opportunity, after years
of restrictions on Jewish land acquisition. The expected
mass immigration of Jewish refugees from all over  the
world increased the need for land, and existing settlements
were also demanding more agricultural land.5 Thus in the
course of war, old and new immigrants were settled in
abandoned Arab villages, including those whose original
inhabitants had found refuge in a neighbouring village.6 In
that period, among other such projects, kibbutz Megiddo
was  established on the  lands  of Lajjun, some of whose
residents moved to Umm el Fahm. Kibbutz Yas’ur in west-
ern Galilee was established on the lands of el-Birweh, whose
residents moved to Majd el-Kurum, Makr, and Jdeideh,
while kibbutz Beit Ha’emek was established on the lands of
Kweikat in western Galilee, some of whose former residents
found refuge in Abu Sinan.7 The settlement of new immi-
grants in abandoned Arab villages was to continue during
the 1950s.
The second reason was security. The dominant concept
among Israeli leadership at the time was that the Palestini-
ans and the Arab states were preparing themselves for a
second round of warfare in order to remove the disgrace of
their defeat in 1948 and destroy the state of Israel. The Arab
citizens of Israel were perceived as a fifth column, waiting
for such a move and preparing to help it. This assumption
resulted in the evacuation of Arab villages from border
areas (Ikrit and Bir’am were the best-known examples).
Thus the Bedouin of the Zbedat tribe in lower Galilee were
evacuated under the accusation that they were delivering
intelligence information from Jordan to Lebanon. Resi-
dents of small villages in the Triangle were transferred to
larger villages.8 The same kind of reasoning led to the
decision to forbid resettlement of abandoned villages. In-
stead, the Internal Refugees were concentrated in towns or
villages and were distanced from strategically important
areas, such as main roads and highways.
The third reason can be seen as vengefulness or, alterna-
tively, as a refusal to reward those who were conceived of
as the agressors. The Jewish community perceived the 1948
war as one which was forced on its peace-loving members,
so in the aftermath many of them supported an Iron Fist
policy toward the Arab citizens, and particularly toward
villagers who participated actively in the fighting. Those
who started the war, so was the consensus, had to pay the
price. Moreover, some believed that allowing the Internal
Refugees to return to their villages in spite of their past
aggression would be perceived by them as an indication of
weakness and would cause them to disparage the state of
Israel. This notion is illustrated in Prime Minister Ben-
Gurion’s reply to a question put by the communist member
of the Knesset (the Israeli parliament), Tawfik Tubi:
The village of Birweh is an abandoned village destroyed in the
battles. Its residents cooperated with the Qawuqji gangs [the
term used by Israeli officials for the Arab Liberation Army,
organised by the Arab Leauge to Assisst Palestinian Arabs in the
war]. The IDF and the government dealt generously with them
and permitted them to stay in villages near Birweh and to be
residents of Israel.9
After the war, which took the life of six thousand Jews,
one per cent of the Jewish population, the Zionist leadership
saw no moral fault in refusing to allow the Internal Refugees
to return home. Permitting them to remain in nearby villages
was presented as a humanitarian gesture. Israel, aided by
UNWRA, provided basic welfare in food and housing, while
the refugees’ land was settled by Jews.
The Appropriation of Land: Legal Mechanisms
Parallel to the denial of return, the state authorities began to
undertake legislative measures designed to legally establish
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the appropriation of the refugees’ lands. In June 1948, the
first  version of regulations transferring the  lands  of  the
refugees to the ownership of the State was published. To-
ward the end of 1949 the formulation of a more comprehen-
sive law, the Law of Absentees’ Property, was drafted for
presentation to the Knesset. The newly established Author-
ity for the Rehabilitation of the Refugees, composed of
experts in land and Arab affairs, worked to define the Inter-
nal Refugees as absentees though they have remained in
Israel, and hence have their lands given to the state. In
October 1949, in the sixth meeting of the Committee, the
Prime Minister’s advisor, Zalman Lif, said: “The revised law
would also include evacuated Arabs. According to the law
every Arab who was not in his place of residence on a certain
date, whatever the reason (plight, evacuation, transfer), is
considered an absentee.”10
Thus in 1950, the Knesset accepted the Law of Absentees’
Property, replacing emergency regulations on the subject.
The definition of an absentee included “every Israeli citizen
who left his regular abode in Israel (a) to a place outside
Israel before 1948 or (b) for a place in Israel which was at
that time occupied by forces which sought to prevent the
establishment of the state of Israel or fought against it after
its establishment.”11 Thus the Internal Refugees were de-
fined as absentees even though they were present in the
State on the relevant date and are legal citizens. This anoma-
lous situation granted them (along with additional popula-
tion groups) the title “present absentees.” The legislation
denied the Internal Refugees any possibility of winning
legal assistance and made the transfer of their assets to the
state completely legal. Appeals to the Supreme Court, based
on claims that leaving their residence was temporary, now
became irrelevant.
Along with this, the authorities encouraged the absorp-
tion of the refugees in the villages which they had fled to.
They were given priority in leasing abandoned lands in
places where they were concentrated. In few villages
(mainly Makr, Jedeida, and Sha’ab in western Galilee, and
Wadi Hamam and Akbara in eastern Galilee) houses were
built for the Internal Refugees, but only on condition that
they sign a document renouncing their assets in their vil-
lages of origin. Despite initial resistance, some refugees
eventually agreed to settle in these villages.12
The 1952 Land Acquisition Law (LAL) gave absolute and
retroactive confirmation to the transfer of the lands of the
Internal Refugees to state ownership. This law included also
lands of Internal Refugees who from a legal point of view
were not absentee, for example those who had left their
villages for others already conquered by the IDF, or who
were sheltering near their village. On the other hand, the
law determined a compensation mechanism for the Inter-
nal Refugees, in money or alternative lands. It was left to
persuade the refugees to accept the compensation money,
to make them sign a document renouncing any claim to
their lands, and to help them resettle in one of the populated
villages.
Landless: Stages in State-Refugee Relations
The introduction of the LAL marked a new era for the
Internal Refugees. Alongside the 1952 decision to transfer
UNRWA’s authorities regarding the refugees to the Israeli
government, the new law ended the period of the creation
of the refugee problem and the appropriation of their lands.
The vast majority of Internal Refugees were now dwelling in
temporary housing in the outskirts of villages in the Galilee
and the Triangle.
The law heralded the second phase of relations between
Israel and the Internal Refugees, which lasted until 1958.
After 1952, there was no more forced transfering of Arab
citizens nor more land allocation by the state without some
legal procedure. A reparation mechanism in the framework
of the LAL was established during these years, yet most of
the refugees upheld their demand to return to their villages,
with only a few of them agreeing to give up their original
homes and lands. During this period the refugees still per-
ceived the prospect of returning to their villages as realistic.
Only a few of them started to build permanent houses,
frequently without permits. Toward the end of the period,
families of Internal Refugees who had spread in different
parts of Israel had began to voluntarily move to one chosen
“temporary” village, in order to live alongside each other.
In retrospect, this could be seen as a first sign of their
coming to terms with the fact that they would probably not
be allowed to reunite in their original home.
The third period, from 1958 to 1967, marked the settle-
ment of the Internal Refugees in the villages in which they
were absorbed. The reasons for their tendency to accept
permanent settlement at that time were threefold. First,
they realized that the refugee problem was not likely to be
resolved by a “second round” of war between Israel and the
Arab states, especially in light of Egypt’s defeat in the 1956
Suez War. A second reason was the improvement and
updating of the state’s reparation mechanism, involving
paying higher sums to the refugees in return for their lands
and speeding up public building in the villages where they
were living. The final reason was the extensive usage by
Israel of the Internal Refugees’ lands, which deepened their
recognition that they will never get it back.
A new era began after the war of 1967, when the issue of
the Internal Refugees was almost entirely removed from the
public agenda. The main reason for this was that the burn-
ing personal problems of most of the refugees were settled,
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both for those who accepted reparations and for those who
managed to cope by themselves. Public attention was now
drawn to the territories conquered in 1967 and their inhabi-
tants. This development was reflected in Knesset debates.
Until 1967 the demand for returning the Internal Refugees
to their villages was raised almost in every Knesset session.
Since 1967 the subject has hardly been mentioned in
Knesset debates.13
In recent years, and most intensively since the 1990s, the
subject is once again emerging on the public agenda of the
Arab population in Israel. The Arab parties and Hadash
party14 demanded a solution to the problem in their election
platforms of 1996 and 1999. Dozens of committees were
established by former inhabitants of abandoned villages
and their descendants, under the umbrella of a national
committee and organizing events in the villages. Last but
not least, commemorating the Nakba (the Palestinian dis-
aster of 1948)  in abandoned  villages has turned  into  a
tradition among Palestinian citizens of Israel in recent
years, under the slogan of returning the Internal Refugees
to their villages.
The State and the Uprooting of Refugee Identity
The activities of refugee committees provide the clearest
indication of the revival of refugee identity among the Inter-
nal Refugees. This relatively new phenomenon is viewed
unfavourably by the state of Israel, which has spent years in
efforts to uproot this identity. In effect, over and above the
legislation aimed at appropriating the lands of the Internal
Refugees, the main state activity regarding this population
was in the realm of identity. This is not a special charac-
teristic of state activity among the refugees; state interven-
tion in creating and neutralizing sub-identities15 constituted
a central element in controlling and supervising the popu-
lation. Through varied bureaucratic and legal means, in-
cluding use of force, the state authorities acted to uproot the
collective refugee identity of this population on the assump-
tion that this would weaken the refugees’ demand to return
to their villages of origin.
Analyzing “refugee identity” is essential to fully compre-
hand this point, and it reveals that this identity has two
faces; one is positive, the other negative. The positive one is
being native to a certain settlement which no longer exists,
cherishing its abandoned pathways, destroyed houses, and
lost scents. This aspect of identity can be called “I was
there.” It was pointedly expressed by Mahmoud Issa in his
research on the refugees of the village of Lubya (which was
located on the Tiberias-Nazareth road): “For youngsters,
middle-aged or old, Lubya constitutes a basic identity im-
age, a source to relate to in thought and sub-consciously, a
model of cultural framework.”16
The other aspect of refugee identity is the negative one,
the self-conception, and the image of one in the eyes of
others as a refugee, a foreigner who doesn’t belong to his
present place of dwelling. This image could be summed up
in the notion: “I am not from here.” This notion is ex-
pressed through a sense of alienation from the place of
refuge, sometimes stressed by rejection projected by the
absorbing community. This characteristic of identity was
shown by Hasan Musa in the mid-1980s in his research
concerning Internal Refugees from four Galilee villages.
Twenty-eight out of eighty Internal Refugees who were
asked about their sentiments reported feelings of alienation
and a notion of being outsiders.17
Israel’s main struggle was naturally directed against the
positive identity, which preserved the connection between
the refugees and their original villages. The action taken by
the state consisted of physical activity aimed directly at the
refugees and their lands, and indirect activity intended to
influence both their consciousness and the general public
discourse on the issue. The direct activity consisted of
preventing the refugees from approaching their abandoned
villages, as well as providing reparations or alternative
housing. Among the measures taken to influence the refu-
gee consciousness were obliterating the names of the aban-
doned villages from state maps; removing the Internal
Refugees from UNWRA figures; registering them in the
Population Registry as inhabitants of their host villages
rather than their original ones; and excluding the aban-
doned villages and the refugee problem from the school
curriculum, including that used for Arab pupils.
Preventing any access to the abandoned villages was
primarily intended to create a complete break between the
refugees and their villages, in order to enable handing over
their lands to Jewish settlement. Accordingly, the first step
to be taken by Israel was the total evacuation of the aban-
doned villages (in most of them there remained between
five  and  ten percent of the original residents).18 Subse-
quently the authorities were strict about repeatedly evacu-
ating refugees who tried to get hold of their lands, with IDF
units patrolling the abandoned villages in order to make
sure that the residents were not to return. Anyone found in
the abandoned villages was removed to neighbouring vil-
lages or expelled from the country.19 In 1951 the sites of the
abandoned villages were declared security areas, permitting
legal measures to be taken against anyone entering them.20
This was an intermediary step toward turning them into
Jewish villages.
However, even after the transfer of the lands to Jewish
settlement, the state continued to ensure that the refugees
would be cut off from their former lands. The relevant
Israeli authorities laid down that “under no circumstances
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must land be leased to Arabs formerly from that village, or
originally from there.” Moreover, they were not permitted
to work, even not as labourers, in their former lands. In
addition, Jews or Arabs leasing land in an abandoned village
had to commit not to employ refugees whose origins were
in that village.21
This was how the state took its primary step in the course
of uprooting the positive refugee identity. The new genera-
tion born after the war, it was thought, would be unable to
develop an emotional connection to the parental village, or
claim “I am from there.” Neither could the older generation
go to their place of origin and point concretely at their
homes. The destruction of the villages during the 1950s and
1960s was to symbolize forever the lack of any prospect of
materializing the refugees’ yearning to return home. But
yet, the authorities assumed that even this was not enough
if the “community of memory” remained intact.
Here, the reparation mechanism came to force. Internal
Refugees were put under enormous pressure to accept com-
pensation arrangements and give up their land. Most Inter-
nal Refugees abstained from demanding reparation for
their lost lands. They perceived such an agreement as cut-
ting themselves off from the ideal of return, on the personal,
communal, and national levels. Moreover, this norm of
refusal constituted a principle, which united the refugees
and preserved their identity. Breaking it would lead to the
disintegration of their communities.
Conscious of all that, the Israeli establishment was striv-
ing to split the refugee consensus. The Israeli authorities
realized that undermining the holy principle of “no com-
pensation” would break the social solidarity of the refugees
and their collective identity. This explains why the Israeli
authorities decided in September 1954 to seek individual
refugees who would agree to accept reparations. They
thought this was the way to break the opposition of the
refugee community to the proposed arrangement.22 As
shown by data from the Israel Land Authority, this activity
proved fruitful.23 The number of Internal Refugees request-
ing reparations and giving up their land constantly grew,
and the refugee identity began to disintegrate. The state’s
success in spreading the refugees in different villages has-
tened the collapse of the old community frameworks which
had preserved the refugee identity.
Alongside those activities, the state kept aiming to pene-
trate the refugee consciousness. In his book, Imagined
Communities, Benedict Anderson presents the role of
Population Census, maps, and museums in the construc-
tion of national identities.24 The same institutions were
used by Israel for uprooting the refugee identity. Israel did
not mention the origins of the Internal Refugees in the
formal statistics; they were not included in the UNWRA
registry and the abandoned villages did not appear on
maps. It goes without saying that no museum was estab-
lished in Israel to commemorate life in the villages which
no longer existed. Altogether these facts are aimed at em-
phasizing the message that the refugees are no longer con-
nected to their original villages, and that they do not
constitute a distinct community.
In Israeli Arab schools, neither the Nakba and the refugee
problem in general, nor the problem of the Internal Refu-
gees in particular, was ever mentioned. Teachers trying to
present these issues were subjected to the scrutiny of the
Security Service,  as was  the  case  of a teacher from  the
northern town of Acre who said: “The government robbed
us of our lands and drove us from our villages though the
holy books of three faiths – the Jewish, the Muslim and the
Christian – state that it is forbidden.” His words were
relayed to the Security Service which passed them on to the
Ministry of Education.25
In the mid-1980s, it looked as if the goal of uprooting the
refugee identity was achieved. In the conclusions of his
research published in 1986, the Israeli-Palestinian sociolo-
gist, Majid al-Haj, wrote: “There is nothing distinguishing
the refugees from other Arabs in the general community.
Unlike refugees in other places, who established voluntary
societies and other social frameworks, the internal Arab
refugees have no organizational frameworks of any sort.”26
Similarly, Alexander Bligh could present the settlement of
the refugees in the state of Israel as a successful example of
such a project.27 Al-Haj added, however, that half of his
interviewees reported  a  “feeling  of being a  refugee”  al-
though this had no concrete expression, at least not in the
position taken by these refugees toward Israeli society or
the state’s establishment.28
The Refugee Identity: Renewed Awakening and
Opposition
The reality described above changed completely in the early
1990s. The political discourse of the Palestinians in Israel
regarding the Internal Refugees was in upheaval. The re-
awakening of  the  refugee identity invoked identification
among the masses. This process kept accelerating with the
establishment of over twenty local associations of Internal
Refugees, under the umbrella of a national committee.
The speedy revival of the “refugee identity” shows that
even without social, institutional, and organizational
frameworks, it was preserved not only by the first genera-
tion, the refugees themselves, but by their descendants as
well. It proves that an internal stratum maintained itself
over the years in spite of the described governmental poli-
cies. We can assume that the preservation of the refugee
identity was fed during the first years by the struggle to
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return to the original villages, and was later reinforced by
the alienation felt by the refugees in their new homes.
This feeling was the result of the objective situation in
these villages, aggravated by a shortage of land. “I generally
try to forget  I am  a refugee,” al-Haj quotes one of his
interviewees, “but when I see the local people going with
their families to their fields, while I, like the other refugees,
have no property, I feel very strongly that I am different
from the other sons of the village.” Many other interviewees
expressed similar sentiments.
In this situation it is no wonder that the negative refugee
identity was preserved into the second generation and be-
came the basis of the refugees’ identity. But the refugee
committees which were established in the 1990s are not
satisfied with only this part of the refugee identity. Most of
their activity aims to reconstruct the positive components
of it. Committee activists, along with some members of the
second and third refugee generations, are renewing physical
contact with the abandoned villages through work camps
and restoration activities, thus strengthening refugee con-
sciousness and identity. Those activities mirror and com-
pete to an extent with the measures taken by the state over
the years, regarding maps, museums (or, in fact, their ab-
sence), and population census. The participation of second
and third generations in those activities helps to strengthen
their contact with their villages of origin and does away in
practice with the separation which the state had tried to
enforce.
In addition, the refugee identity is strengthened by a
series of symbolic and educational means intended to con-
struct a new discourse. In recent years quite a few books
concerning the abandoned villages were published by Pal-
estinian citizens of Israel and in other Palestinian commu-
nities. Some, like All That Remains by Walid Khalidi,
document all the villages,29 while the majority survey par-
ticular villages or districts in pre-1948 Palestine. Written by
refugees, internal or external, in the framework of academic
research or as a private initiative, these books constitute a
mobile written museum.
The refugees’ committees are now planning a census of
Israel’s Internal Refugees. In addition to strengthening
identity, this will constitute the factual basis for planned
legal and public struggles. Another move aimed at recon-
stituting lost communities is the rehabilitation of those who
accepted reparations in the past.
All in all,  it appears that the attempts by  the  Israeli
establishment to neutralize refugee identity have failed, just
as the supreme goal for which it strove – the creation of an
Arab-Israeli identity cut off from maternal Palestinian identity
– did not succeed. Perhaps it shoes how limited external
factors are in the process of crystallization of identities.
However, in order to present a full picture, one must
examine the reawakening of the refugee identity in its his-
torical context, along with the beginning of negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinian political leadership. As
the political dialogue proceeded, it seemed that the contra-
diction between the focal points of identity among Pales-
tinians in Israel – Israeli civic identity on one hand and
Palestinian national identity on the other – was diminished.
This process brought about a strengthening of Israeli iden-
tity among the Palestinians in Israel (along with, and not
instead of, their Palestinian identity). It has been acknow-
ledged by the P.L.O. and the Israeli government, who
agreed not to include the Internal Refugee problem in the
discussion (yet to take place in the unforseeable future) of
the general Palestinian refugee problem. The Internal Refu-
gees have decided to carry on with their struggle as Israeli
citizens, demanding the correction of an injustice done to
them. The Internal Refugees, as the other Palestinian citi-
zens of Israel, hoped that the peace process would encour-
age Israel to come to terms with them as well as with the
P.L.O. and the Palestinians in the occupied territories and
the diaspora.30
Another explanation for renewal of the refugees’ struggle
is one suggested by Arnon Sofer. Sofer believes that it is a
result of a feeling among Israeli Arabs that Israeli sover-
eignty in areas of dense Arab population was weakened
through prolonged Israeli compromise. He claims that the
demands of the Internal Refugees are part of a process
aiming to transform Israel from a Jewish state to a state
of all its citizens.31 According to this concept, strengthening
the Palestinian identity of Arab Israeli citizens, like the
reinforcement of refugee identity, represents a threat to the
Jewish-Zionist identity of Israel.
The demographic factor should also be considered. As
years went by, the refugees’ descendants were more and
more distressed by the problem of land shortage. Israel kept
appropriating land from villages which were not destroyed
during the 1948 war. However, the land and housing prob-
lems of the Internal Refugees (especially those who refused
to accept reparations) were much graver than those of the
rest of the population. The hope voiced by activists that the
lands could be returned by a political struggle gave some
new hope.
The above-mentioned factors complement one another,
and each of them had its influence on the revival of the
refugee identity. Nevertheless, in spite of this revival of
identity, and activities in the abandoned villages, it is still
too early to determine to what extent the revival incorpo-
rates the whole refugee population (some villages have not
organized at all, others have only symbolic representation).
Neither is it clear to what extent they will persist in their
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struggle and how successful it will be. The answers to those
questions depend greatly on the position to be adopted by
the state. For the time being one can hardly observe any sign
of change in Israel’s old policies, opposing any expression
of the right of return for refugees, internal or external. The
armed conflict between Israel and the Palestinian National
Authority since the outburst of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in
October 2000, as well as the crisis of trust between the state
and its Arab citizens in the wake of these events, has only
resulted up to now in strengthening the traditional Jewish-
Israeli position rejecting any change in the status quo.
Hence the Israeli Cabinet’s decision in October 2001 not to
allow the Ikrit and Bir’am refugees to return to their homes
(contrary to former recommendations). To justify that de-
cision, it was argued that in spite of the special circustances
of those refugees, their return would set a precedent,
strengthening the demands of return voiced by the rest of
the 150,000 Internal Refugees all over the country.
The failure of negotiations between Israel and the Pales-
tinians at Camp David (in 2000), which was explained in
the official  Israeli  political  discourse  as stemming from
Palestinian obstinacy over “the Right of Return,” only in-
creased Israeli opposition to any concessions for the Inter-
nal Refugees. The reasoning for that approach varies
between explanations  regarding security  and a declared
wish to maintain the Jewish-Zionist character of the state.
Naturally, the Internal Refugee committees are con-
scious of the fears of the Jewish public and the Israeli
establishment concerning their demands, and are aware
that there is little hope of achieving a return to the pre-1948
situation. Therefore, in general, they are not demanding the
return of all their land, but only the parts of it which are not
worked or settled. According to their initial surveys, a
substantial part of the lands in many abandoned villages is
deserted. It is those lands that they demand to get back.
However, even limiting their demands did not yield a
change in the state’s position. Most of the committees’
activities are therefore directed at present toward internal
organizational work and raising the subject of the Internal
Refugees in the overall Israeli political discourse.
To conclude, one could establish that during the last
decade the internal refugees have undergone two major
political developments. The first was re-establishing their
collective refugee identity (including its positive compo-
nent) as a tool of activity, and the second was coming to
terms with their status as Israeli citizens, hence defining
their struggle as a civic rather than a national one. To their
dismay, they have not witnessed any significant change in
the attitude of the Israeli government  toward  their  de-
mands. Furthermore, the current crisis in the Israeli-Pales-
tinian relationship in general, and between Israel and its
Arab citizens in particular, led Israel to harden even further
its position regarding their problem. It seems at the mo-
ment that only a process of reconciliation between Israel,
the Palestinians, and the Palestinian citizens of Israel might
enable a change in the Israeli point of view on this matter.
Without such a change, the problem of the Internal Refu-
gees will remain unsolved.
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